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“There can be no peace without justice, no justice without law
and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just
and lawful under any given circumstance.”1
INTRODUCTION
he Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) is more than just the governing body of the world’s
most popular sport.2 For perspective, the organization has more
member associations than the General Assembly of the United
Nations.3 Due to the popularity of soccer,4 FIFA yields almost
limitless power, and its position in the international community
allows it to influence matters outside of the sport.5 In fact, FIFA
itself proclaims: “[W]e have a responsibility that goes beyond the
development of football and the organisation of our competitions.
FIFA upholds the respect for human rights and the application
1. Rome Charter of the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS,
http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
2. See FREDERICK O. MUELLER, ROBERT C. CANTU & STEVEN P. VAN CAMP,
CATASTROPHIC INJURIES INHIGH SCHOOL ANDCOLLEGE SPORTS 57 (1996).
3. See Anthony Lopopolo, Kosovo, Gibraltar Admitted as FIFA Members
Ahead of World Cup Qualifying, SCORE (May 13, 2016),
http://www.thescore.com/uefa/news/1026339 (“FIFA . . . has more members
(209) than [the] UN General Assembly (193)”).
4. See The History of the World Cup, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/world-
cup/history/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (“An accumulated audience of
over 37 billion people watched the France [19]98 tournament, including ap-
proximately 1.3 billion for the final alone.”).
5. See Christina Malliris, The Dark Side of FIFA: Selected Controversies
and the Future of Accountability in the Organization, SOCCER POL. BLOG,
https://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/tournament-guides/world-cup-2014/fifa-institu-
tional-politics/the-dark-side-of-fifa-controversies-and-the-future/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2015); see also Building a Better Future, FIFA (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.fifa.com/development/videos/y=2014/m=11/video=building-a-bet-
ter-future-2477118.html (stating that “[f]ootball has the power to bring people
together and to break down barriers. It gives FIFA a platform to improve
standards of education, health and sustainability, and to raise living standards
and quality of life across the world.”).
T
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of international norms of behaviour as a principle and part of all
our activities.”6
With such power and influence has come susceptibility to cor-
ruption and financial mismanagement,7 particularly with re-
spect to hosting and televising the organization’s main event: the
FIFA World Cup.8 This rise of corruption has lasted several dec-
ades,9 and up until the summer of 2015, the popularity of the
sport provided a shield against arrests and prosecutions of the
FIFA organization and its officials.10
On May 27, 2015, however, this once impenetrable armor was
pierced when the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced
its indictment of nine high-ranking FIFA officials for their in-
volvement in accepting bribes relating to the broadcast of FIFA
matches.11 Over the span of two decades, these officials received
bribes from international marketing agencies totaling
6. Statement From Jérôme Valcke On Labour Rights In Qatar, FIFA (Nov.
17, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2011/m=11/news=Statement-
from-jeromevalcke-labour-rights-qatar-1544426.html.
7. SeeMalliris, supra note 5.
8. FIFA Admits To World Cup Hosting Bribes, Asks U.S. Prosecutors For
Cash, ESPN (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2830672/fifa-admits-to-world-cup-
hosting-bribes (stating that FIFA admitted to vote buying for the rights to host
past World Cups, albeit without specifically identifying which World Cups
were the result of vote buying).
9. See alsoDAVIDLAWLER, FREQUENTLYASKEDQUESTIONSONANTI-BRIBERY
AND CORRUPTION 40–41 (2012). See generally ANDREW JENNINGS, FOUL!: THE
SECRETWORLD OF FIFA (2008).
10. The most recent corruption case being against former FIFA President
Joao Havalange. See ELESA ZEHNDORFER, CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP: THE ROLE
OF CHARISMA IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 97–98 (2016); JENNINGS, supra
note 9.
11. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Five
Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption
(May 27, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-cor-
porate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and (“The defendants
charged in the indictment include high-ranking officials of . . . FIFA . . . as well
as leading officials of other soccer governing bodies that operate under the
FIFA umbrella. Jeffrey Webb and Jack Warner – the current and former pres-
idents of CONCACAF, the continental confederation under FIFA headquar-
tered in the United States – are among the soccer officials charged with rack-
eteering and bribery offenses. The defendants also include U.S. and South
American sports marketing executives who are alleged to have systematically
paid and agreed to pay well over $150 million in bribes and kickbacks to obtain
lucrative media and marketing rights to international soccer tournaments.”).
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$150,000,000 USD for media and marketing rights for interna-
tional soccer tournaments.12 Attorney General Loretta Lynch
utilized FIFA’s usage of U.S. financial institutions for launder-
ing money as the basis for personal jurisdiction in the United
States.13 The federal indictment in total contained forty-seven
counts involving bribery, fraud, and money laundering.14 The fi-
nancial gymnastics used by FIFA officials in aiding their finan-
cial corruption included: using fake consulting contracts, send-
ing money through associates working in the financial industry,
creating shell companies in tax havens, hiding foreign bank ac-
counts, using safe deposit boxes, and surreptitiously concealing
cash through a process known as “bulk cash smuggling.”15
The DOJ indictment also spawned several other investigations
with respect to corruption committed by FIFA officials. For ex-
ample, in 2015 Switzerland commenced an investigation against
FIFA’s then-president Sepp Blatter16 for his alleged criminal
mismanagement of FIFA for entering into deals that were dis-
advantageous to the organization.17 Thereafter, the FIFA Ethics
Committee banned Blatter from soccer for eight years due to eth-
ical violations.18 Subsequently, a 2016 FIFA election was held in
which Gianni Infantino was elected as Blatter’s replacement,
12. See Stephanie Clifford & Matt Apuzzo, After Indicting 14, U.S. Vows to
End Graft in FIFA, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2015, at A1.
13. See id.
14. See id.; see also Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Hemisphere of Soccer Corrup-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2015/05/27/sports/soccer/fifa-indictments.html (detailing the DOJ’s inves-
tigation resulting in the indictment of over forty individuals from twenty-four
different nations around the world).
15. See Clifford & Apuzzo, supra note 12. For a general overview of “bulk
cash smuggling,” see FAQ: Bulk Cash Smuggling, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/bulk-cash-smuggling-center/faq (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2016).
16. Shortly after the DOJ investigation, FIFA’s then-President, Sepp Blat-
ter, stepped down from his position only three days after winning reelection for
his fifth term. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Sepp Blatter Stepping Down, Says
FIFA Needs ‘Profound Overhaul’, CNN (June 3, 2015), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2015/06/02/football/fifa-sepp-blatter-presidency-successor-elec-
tion/.
17. See Dan Roan, FIFA: Sepp Blatter Faces Swiss Criminal Investigation,
BBC (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34363289.
18. See Rob Bagchi, Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini Banned for Eight Years
by FIFA, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/foot-
ball/2015/dec/21/sepp-blatter-michel-platini-banned-from-football-fifa.
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who vowed to “the stakeholders, national associations, leagues,
clubs, players and . . . fans [that] you will be proud of FIFA, you
will be proud of what FIFA will do for football.”19 Shortly there-
after, President Infantino was named in the 2016 Panama Pa-
pers scandal20 for his signatures on contracts related to alleged
bribery in consideration for television broadcast rights of soccer
games in South America, where he served as director of legal
services of the Union of European Football Associations, the
FIFA division overseeing European soccer.21
Alongside the various scandals engulfing FIFA and its offi-
cials, in 2015 Switzerland also began investigating alleged vote
buying and bribery surrounding the successful bids of Russia
and Qatar to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups respectively.22
Specifically in the case of the 2022 World Cup, news reports al-
leged that corruption, through the acceptance of Qatari bribes
by FIFA officials in exchange for votes for the country, was the
only logical reason for the selection of Qatar as host country for
the 2022 World Cup.23 At the time of the country’s selection, Qa-
tar was ill-equipped to handle the infrastructure requirements
19. See Andy Swales, Gianni Infantino Vows to Unify Football After Win-
ning FIFA Presidency Election, SKY SPORTS (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.sky-
sports.com/football/news/11095/10183073/gianni-infantino-time-for-fifa-to-re-
gain-its-respect.
20. Generally, the Panama Papers scandal relates to the 2016 leak by Mos-
sack Fonesca, a Panamanian law firm, which divulged the identity of wealthy
and powerful individuals who used Panama as a tax haven to shield assets for
the purpose of tax avoidance. For a brief overview of the scandal, see Panama
Papers Q&A: What is the Scandal About?, BBC (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-35954224.
21. See Owen Gibson, Panama Papers: FIFA President Gianni Infantino
Pulled Into Corruption Scandal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/05/panama-papers-pull-fifa-uefa-
chief-gianni-infantino-corruption-scandal.
22. See Office of the Att’y Gen. of Switz., The Office of the Attorney General
of Switzerland Seizes Documents at FIFA, FED. COUNCIL (May 27, 2015),
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-
57391.html.
23. See Nik Cubrilovic, FIFA’s Impossible, Corrupt Qatar Math: How FIFA
Had to Have Known Forced Labor Was Needed for 2022’s Qatari World Cup,
DAILY BEAST (May 31, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti-
cles/2015/05/31/fifa-s-impossible-corrupt-qatar-math-how-fifa-had-to-have-
known-forced-labor-was-needed-for-2022-s-qatari-world-cup.html; see also
Last Week Tonight (HBO television broadcast June 8, 2014); James Montague,
Corruption Allegations Rock Qatar’s Successful 2022 World Cup Bid, CNN
(June 2, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/02/sport/football/football-qatar-
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of hosting the event and had a deplorable track record of abusing
migrant workers through its kafala24 system that governs mi-
grant labor.25 Ultimately, Qatar’s winning bid for the 2022
World Cup through vote buying had the practical effect of sanc-
tioning even greater mistreatment of migrant workers who
would be needed to build the new infrastructure necessary to
host the 2022 World Cup.26 Currently, under the kafala system,
migrant workers must pay exorbitant fees to recruiting agencies
to secure work placement in Qatar.27 Upon arrival, Qatari law
requires migrant workers to be sponsored by their employers,
who wield an inordinate amount of power over these individu-
als.28 Practically speaking, the kafala system provides the op-
portunity for migrant workers to be exploited by their employers
and subjected to inhumane treatment, which frequently in-
cludes confiscation of their passports, nonpayment of wages, in-
hospitable living conditions, and even death.29 As a result, one
can argue that FIFA’s actions in granting Qatar the 2022 World
Cup were complicit in human rights violations.30 The argument
would be that FIFA officials acted with indifference toward Qa-
tar’s human rights violations in awarding the country the World
Cup and knew that mistreatment of migrant workers would
likely occur in building the country’s infrastructure due to Qa-
tar’s checkered treatment of this group in the past.
world-cup-sunday-times/; The Five-Year Anniversary of the Baffling 2022
World Cup Vote, the Beginning of FIFA’s Reckoning, VICE SPORTS (Dec. 3,
2015), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/the-five-year-anniversary-of-the-
baffling-2022-world-cup-vote-the-beginning-of-fifas-reckoning; FIFA Admits
To World Cup Hosting Bribes, Asks U.S. Prosecutors For Cash, supra note 8.
24. For an in-depth analysis on Qatar’s system of governing immigrant la-
bor, also known as kafala, see infra Part II.
25. Qatar’s plan involved importing migrant workers in order to build the
new stadiums, bridges, and roads. See Cubrilovic, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. Id.
29. Id. A 2015 report by the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC) suggested that one thousand migrant workers died in Qatar in 2012
and 2013. See Qatar Rejects 7,000 World Cup Deaths Claim, SKY NEWS (Dec.
21, 2015), http://news.sky.com/story/1609799/qatar-rejects-7000-world-cup-
deaths-claim.
30. See infra Part IV.
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Yet, FIFA’s role in exacerbating human right abuses in Qatar
may go unpunished if national courts in Qatar, Switzerland,31 or
the United States fail to prosecute the organization or its offi-
cials. Currently, the two principal global bodies for hearing crim-
inal actions—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the
U.N.’s International Court of Justice (ICJ)—cannot hear a case
against FIFA or its officials because the charters establishing
their existence either do not allow organizations like FIFA to be
a party32 or provide too narrow of a jurisdictional basis to hear a
case involving individual liability of FIFA officials as accom-
plices.33 The Statute of the International Court of Justice (the
“ICJ Statute”), which established the ICJ, prevents the court
from having personal jurisdiction over the FIFA organization34
or its officials because they are not state parties.35 In addition,
the Rome Charter of the International Criminal Court (the
“Rome Charter”), which created the ICC, prevents the ICC from
exercising personal jurisdiction over the FIFA organization36 be-
cause the charter limits personal jurisdiction to natural per-
sons.37 Further, the ICC would be limited in exercising personal
jurisdiction over FIFA officials because they were not directly
involved in the commission of human rights crimes in the form
31. FIFA is headquartered in Switzerland and is subject to the country’s
laws and regulations. See Roger Pielke Jr., How Can FIFA be Held Accounta-
ble, 16 SPORTMGMT. REV. 255 (2013).
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. Id.
34. Despite being structured as an association with a not-for-profit purpose,
FIFA made over $5.7 billion USD in revenue from 2011–2014. See FIFA, FAQ:
SETTING THERECORDSTRAIGHT (2014), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tour-
nament/competition/02/36/32/63/faq_en_neutral.pdf; FIFA, FINANCIAL REPORT
2014 (2015), http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administra-
tion/02/56/80/39/fr2014weben_neutral.pdf.
35. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ].
36. See Rome Charter of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Charter]. The French delegation
tried to include “legal persons” or “juridical persons” within the list of persons
over which the ICC had jurisdiction during the founding stages of the Rome
Charter, but its proposal ultimately was not adopted. See Per Saland, Interna-
tional Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL COURT – THE
MAKING OF THEROMECHARTER: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULT 199 (Roy S. Lee
ed. 1999).
37. See infra Part I.B.
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of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or acts of ag-
gression.38 Instead, FIFA officials would have to be charged as
accomplices to Qatari human rights abuses. Recently, the ICC
announced that it will begin prosecuting chief executive officers
(CEOs) of multinational organizations.39 Yet, the scope of these
prosecutions will be restricted to environmental crimes commit-
ted by the CEOs of an organization, which unnecessarily limits
the types of activities and the individuals that the ICC would be
able to exercise jurisdiction over with respect to accomplice lia-
bility. Further, in general, the individual accomplice liability
section of the Rome Charter is written too restrictively,40 which
also limits the power of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over busi-
ness officials. Consequently, in order to prevent future organiza-
tions and their officials from using jurisdictional deficiencies in
the international criminal law system to avoid criminal liability,
members of the ICC should draft an amendment to the Rome
Charter to enhance the jurisdiction of the ICC and to ensnare
future liable parties. The solution calls for explicitly adding
nonnatural entities (like the FIFA organization) to the personal
jurisdiction of the court, adjusting the mens rea requirement in
the accomplice liability section from “purposely” to “knowingly,”
drafting a clear definition of “substantially facilitate” in the ac-
tus reus section of accomplice liability, and including language
that provides for liability when an accomplice buries his or her
head in the sand and, by doing so, exacerbates current human
rights atrocities.
This Note will examine how FIFA officials’ acceptance of Qa-
tari bribes to host the 2022 World Cup exposed alarming juris-
dictional inadequacies of the ICJ and the ICC to adjudicate cases
where white-collar crimes41 lead to human rights abuses. The
38. “Directly” involves actual participation and ordering or directing others
to commit the crimes. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, arts. 5–8.
39. See Shehab Khan, CEOs Can Now Be Tried Under International Law at
the Hague for Environmental Crimes, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ceos-hague-international-
law-tried-environmental-crimes-icc-a7315866.html.
40. See infra Part III.B.
41. For the purposes of this Note, white-collar crimes refer to acts of decep-
tion whose purpose is to achieve an illicit financial gain. Examples include “tax
evasion, insider trading, insurance fraud, bribery, embezzlement, and money
laundering.” White Collar Crime, HG LEGAL RESOURCES,
https://www.hg.org/white-collar-crime.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). These
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deficiencies of these global courts provide the potential for future
organizations and their officials to exploit jurisdictional nuance
in order to avoid being prosecuted for international crimes. Part
I of this Note will discuss the two preeminent judicial bodies for
adjudicating international crimes: the ICJ and the ICC. Specifi-
cally, this Part will discuss the origins of the two courts and the
circumstances that led to their creation. It will also articulate
the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the respective
courts and their jurisdictional limitations that prevent them
from adjudicating cases where white-collar crimes lead to hu-
man rights abuses.
Part II will describe the kafala system that governs Qatar’s
migrant worker population and how the system is used by em-
ployers, who are required to sponsor and have legal responsibil-
ity over migrant workers, to exploit these individuals. This Part
continues by addressing FIFA’s involvement in Qatar, which
stems from a corrupt bidding process where FIFA officials ac-
cepted bribes from Qatar in order to secure votes for the country
to host the 2022 World Cup. Such white-collar crimes had the
effect of sanctioning further abuses of migrant workers, who
would be needed to construct new infrastructure necessary to
host the World Cup.
Part III will assess how the jurisdictional limitations of both
the ICJ and the ICC prevent these global criminal courts from
having jurisdiction over organizations like FIFA. The ICC, how-
ever, does provide for jurisdiction over individuals who directly
or indirectly commit crimes under its jurisdiction, which include
human rights abuses. FIFA’s involvement in Qatari human
rights abuses was indirect (in that, FIFA officials did not exploit
migrant workers themselves), so these individuals would need
to be prosecuted in the ICC as accomplices under Article 25(3)(c)
of the Rome Charter. This Part then analyzes the merits and
limitations of prosecuting FIFA officials as accomplices in the
ICC and addresses why the FIFA example is important to the
international criminal law construct.
Finally, Part IV offers a solution that advocates for explicitly
adding nonnatural persons (like the FIFA organization) to the
Rome Charter, which will enable the ICC to exercise personal
jurisdiction over these entities. The amendment also calls for
activities are distinguished from traditional crimes like assault, murder, and
rape, which are more violent in nature.
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tweaking language within the mens rea and actus reus portions
of Article 25 of the Rome Charter in order to broaden the scope
of the accomplice liability section. These adjustments will em-
power the ICC jurisdictionally to hear cases where white-collar
crimes lead to violations of international human rights and will
help to prevent future organizations and their officials from ex-
ploiting jurisdictional inadequacies of global courts to avoid
prosecution.
I. CURRENT JURISDICTION OFGLOBAL CRIMINAL COURTS
This Part will describe the historical impetus and creation of
the two global venues for international criminal adjudication:
the ICJ and the ICC. It will also articulate the basis for jurisdic-
tion within each venue and the inherent jurisdictional limita-
tions of each court that prevent them from adjudicating crimes
where an organization or its officials’ white-collar crimes lead to
human rights abuses. The failure of the world’s two main inter-
national criminal courts to have jurisdiction over these types of
crimes is problematic because it allows for organizations and
their officials to avoid criminal prosecutions internationally.
Without the ability to hear such cases, these courts are inher-
ently inept in an age where businesses and organizations oper-
ate globally.
A. The ICJ
The idea of having judicial forums for international dispute
resolution is not novel but rather traces back to when ad hoc
tribunals were established by the ancient Greeks and Romans
to resolve cross-border disagreements.42 This concept was rein-
forced with the rise of state sovereignty43 and an increase in in-
terstate disputes.44 The realization of a functional international
court, however, did not occur until the creation of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA).45 The PCA was initiated by Czar Ni-
colas II of Russia, whose aim was to achieve “the most objective
42. To see the extensive history leading up to the creation of the ICJ, see
MOHAMED SAMEHM. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIALORGAN OF THEUNITEDNATIONS 6–12 (2002).
43. State sovereignty was attributed to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Id.
at 6.
44. Id.
45. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 called for the creation
of the PCA. See RUTHMACKENZIE, KATEMALLESON, PENNYMARTIN, & PHILIPPE
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means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting
peace, and above all, of limiting the progressive development of
existing armaments.”46 Among the objectives of the conferences
was to build off the momentum of the prior one hundred years,
which accounted for a few successful international arbitrations,
and to create “the first global mechanism for the settlement of
disputes between States.”47 Despite having some significant lim-
itations, including the inability for the court to exert jurisdiction
on its own, the PCA legitimized the idea of international dispute
resolution.48 Together with the PCA’s successor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ),49 these independent tribu-
nals helped shape the modern day ICJ.
The ICJ is inextricably connected to the United Nations. The
U.N. as an organization was established through the multilat-
eral treaty known as the Charter of the United Nations (the
“U.N. Charter”),50 which ultimately promulgated the ICJ as a
part of the U.N.51 Additionally, annexed to the U.N. Charter is
the ICJ Statute, which “organize[s] the composition and the
functioning of the Court.” 52 Under the U.N. Charter, the ICJ is
known as a “principal organ” of the U.N.53 and stands on equal
footing with the other five bodies of the organization, including
the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social
Council, Trusteeship Council, and Secretariat.54 As the judicial
SANDS, SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS
10–11 (2010); AMR, supra note 42, at 10.
46. History, PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduc-
tion/history/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
47. Id.
48. See AMR, supra note 42, at 11–12.
49. Id. at 12. In 1922, the PCIJ was created by the Covenant of the League
of Nations and served as a predecessor to the ICJ. The work of the PCIJ, which
issued twenty-nine opinions and twenty-seven advisory opinions, played an
important role in leading to the ICJ as it established “the first permanent in-
ternational tribunal with general jurisdiction, [and] made possible the clarifi-
cation of a number of aspects of international law.” Publications of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (1922-1946), INT’LCT. JUST., http://www.icj-
cij.org/pcij/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
50. See U.N. Charter art. 92.
51. Id.
52. Statute of the Court, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docu-
ments/?p1=4&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
53. See Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice, supra note 35, art. 7, para. 1.
54. See U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 7.
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arm55 of the U.N., the ICJ provides a venue to hear international
disputes.56 In accordance with the ICJ Statute, the ICJ has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the interpretation of treaties,
breaches of international obligations, damages for such
breaches, and questions of international law 57 (which, important
for context in this Note, includes violations of international law
related to migrant workers).58 The court thus has general subject
matter jurisdiction over international disputes, including indi-
rect human rights violations of migrant workers that were alleg-
edly committed by the FIFA organization and its officials.
The ICJ, however, does have limitations.59 For example, if an
issue is considered a domestic matter, or in other words, is
55. Id. art. 92.
56. See AMR, supra note 42, at 12–13.
57. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 36, para. (2)(a)–(c).
58. Qatar is a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO),
which “brings together governments, employers and workers representatives
of 187 member States [of the U.N.] to set labour standards, develop policies
and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men.” About
the ILO, INT’L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang—en/in-
dex.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). Qatar has ratified five ILO conventions,
including ones that address “the elimination of forced and compulsory labor . .
. .” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BUILDING A BETTER WORLD CUP, PROTECTING
MIGRANT WORKERS IN QATAR AHEAD OF FIFA 2022, at 45 (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/qatar0612webwcover_0.pdf (ci-
tations omitted). The ILO Convention on Forced Labor specifically requires
members to oversee that employers do not use tactics that constitute forced or
compulsory labor, including:
“financial penalties, denunciation to authorities—including
police and immigration—and deportation, dismissal from
current employment, exclusion from future employment, . . .
removal of rights and privileges” . . . physical confinement in
the work location, . . . induced indebtedness (by falsification
of accounts, excessive interest charges, etc.), deception about
types and terms of work, withholding and non-payment of
wages, and retention of identity documents or other valuable
personal possessions. (citations omitted).
Id. at 45. Because certain actions taken by Qatari employers, including with-
holding and non-payment of wages and retention and confiscation of passports,
violate the ILO Convention on Forced Labor, and thus international law, the
ICJ in theory would have subject matter jurisdiction over such Qatari human
rights abuses. See infra Part II.A.
59. The ICJ receives cases through three primary means, all of which in-
clude direct consent of the parties: (1) when the parties agree to compulsory
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within the confines of a particular state, the U.N. Charter pre-
cludes U.N. intervention in the dispute, and, by extension, the
ICJ will not be able to hear such a case.60 Further, while judg-
ments rendered in the ICJ are binding on the state parties of the
lawsuit,61 the ICJ does not allow the states to appeal the decision
in the event one party disagrees with the court’s verdict.62 In ad-
dition, while the U.N. Charter allows for amendments to ICJ ju-
risdiction, the procedure is lengthy and rather cumbersome.63
More importantly, particularly in the context of FIFA, personal
jurisdiction is limited to state parties,64 making individuals and
nonnatural persons, like corporations, non-profits, and associa-
tions, outside the ambit of ICJ personal jurisdiction.65
As a result, while the ICJ may have subject matter jurisdiction
over violations of international law related to the rights of mi-
grant workers, the global court presently lacks personal jurisdic-
tion over the FIFA organization or its officials individually be-
cause they are not states. Consequently, the ICJ would only
have partial jurisdiction over FIFA or its officials, which would
preclude the court from adjudicating any issue regarding human
rights abuses committed in Qatar.
jurisdiction, (2) when the parties agree to submit a specific issue to the ICJ,
and (3) through a special provision in a treaty which submits the case to the
ICJ if the parties cannot reach a peaceful agreement on their own. See Statute
of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 36; BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 298–307 (6th ed. 2011). For an extensive analysis of the
different methods of case referral and the pros and cons of each, see AMR, supra
note 42, at 178–92.
60. See AMR, supra note 42, at 45.
61. Article 94 of the U.N. Charter states: “Each member of the United Na-
tions undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Jus-
tice in any case to which it is a party.” Recourse for failing to follow the ICJ
judgment is administered by the Security Council and the Charter empowers
it to “make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect
to the judgment.” U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 94, ¶ 2.
62. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 60.
63. An amendment to the Charter requires a supermajority acceptance by
members of the General Assembly, followed by its ratification by the Security
Council. See U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 108; Egon Schwelb, The Process
of Amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 64 AM. J. INT’LL.
880, 880–81 (1970).
64. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 34. Nevertheless, non-ratify-
ing states of the U.N. Charter may agree to jurisdiction in the ICJ through an
agreement. See U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 36, ¶¶ 4–5.
65. See U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 34.
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B. The ICC
The creation of the ICC occurred after the Nürnberg trials of
World War II, when the U.N. summoned the creation of an In-
ternational Law Commission (the “Commission”) to “crystal-
lize”66 the current sentiment of genocide.67 Among the many
tasks of the Commission was creating a statute dedicated to the
establishment of an international criminal court and to define
certain types of crimes the court would hear.68 In addition to the
work of the Commission, the U.N. created its own committee
dedicated to drafting a statute for the creation of an interna-
tional criminal court, which was completed in 1952.69
The process of creating an international criminal court, how-
ever, remained stagnant until the creation of ad hoc tribunals,
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in the 1990s,70 which dealt with wide-scale hu-
man rights atrocities perpetrated by individuals.71 The ad hoc
tribunals were created specifically to adjudicate certain types of
66. In international law, the collective actions and decrees by states on a
particular issue create norms, which represent a general sentiment of the in-
ternational community on the rules surrounding that topic. “Crystallization”
of law refers to capturing and codifying the emerging rule in order to create a
body of persuasive international law. See generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts,
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Rec-
onciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001).
67. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 8 (3d ed. 2007).
68. Id. at 8–9.
69. Id. at 9. The International Law Commission subsequently finished its
version of the statute in 1954.
70. To see the lasting impression of the ICTY on the prosecution of interna-
tional crimes, see Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International
Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 35–36, 62–67 (2014) (discussing
how the ICTY has handled some of the most complex cases in a cost efficient
manner). To see the jurisdictional impact of the ICTR as a forum for hearing
international disputes, see Irene C. Lu, Curtain Call at Closing: The Multi-
Dimensional Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 34 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 859, 882–97 (2013).
71. See Ad-Hoc Tribunals, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/international-criminal-jurisdiction/ad-
hoc-tribunals/overview-ad-hoc-tribunals.htm.
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crimes, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and gen-
ocide.72 Despite their inherent limitations,73 ad hoc tribunals
were relatively successful74 because they ultimately provided in-
sight into how an international criminal court could operate pro-
cedurally.75 While imperfect, the ad hoc tribunals’ success as fo-
rums to adjudicate individual liability of international crimes ul-
timately led to the signing of the Rome Charter76 and the estab-
lishment of the ICC on July 1, 2002.77
At first glance, the ICC seems like a viable court to prosecute
FIFA officials rather than the FIFA organization because it pro-
vides for jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated by individuals.78
In addition, the ICC is not a judicial organ of the U.N.79 Rather,
72. Id.
73. The ad hoc tribunals raised issues of the definitional scope of crimes and
the defendant’s right to a fair trial. For other jurisdictional issues raised by the
ICTY, see Bartram S. Brown, The International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (David P. Forsythe
ed., 2009). For a discussion on the lack of redress for victims of Rwandan gen-
ocide through the ICTR, see José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 413 (1999). For a discussion on
the failure to address competing jurisdictional claims between the ICTR and
Rwandan Courts, see id. at 417.
74. Compare RACHELKERR, THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINALTRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 209
(2004), and GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINSTHUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 73 (1st ed. 1999), with Timothy L. H. McCormack & Sue
Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the New Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1999).
75. See SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 13.
76. The final vote was 120 to 7 in favor with 21 abstentions for a treaty
establishing an international criminal court. See Jerry Fowler, The Rome
Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A Framework of International Jus-
tice for Future Generations, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 1, 1998, at 1, http://digital-
commons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1557&con-
text=hrbrief. The ratification of the Rome Charter, however, was far from a
smooth process. In the events leading up to the ratification of the Rome Char-
ter, states formed constituencies aligned with their beliefs. See SCHABAS, supra
note 67, at 18, 21. The political jockeying between the constituencies slowed
down the ratification process to the point where the parties almost missed the
deadline for ratification. See generally MICHAEL J. STRUET, THE POLITICS OF
CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGO’S, DISCOURSE, AND
AGENCY 83–131 (2008). See also SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 18, 21.
77. See Rome Charter, supra note 36.
78. Id. art. 25.
79. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 7, para. 1.
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the ICC is an independent judicial body80 and is dedicated to ad-
judicating international crimes on a global scale.81
Procedurally, certain protocols must be met before the ICC can
adjudicate a case. For example, the court’s jurisdiction must first
be triggered in one of three ways: (1) the “crimes . . . [are] re-
ferred to the Prosecutor by a State Party,”82 (2) the “crimes [are]
referred to the Prosecutor by the [U.N.] Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,”83 or (3) “[t]he
Prosecutor . . . initiate[s] an investigation.”84 on his or her own.
Further, an additional notice requirement might be needed prior
to the court hearing the case, depending on the manner in which
jurisdiction is triggered.85
Once the court’s jurisdiction is triggered, it still has to deter-
mine if it has a sufficient jurisdictional basis to hear the case.86
The ICC has subject matter jurisdiction over crimes described as
the “most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole”87 and “unimaginable atrocities that deeply
80. That being said, the U.N. Security Council can refer cases to the ICC
according to Article 13(b) of the Rome Charter and Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. See UN Documentation: International Law, UNITED NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last updated Sept. 22, 2016).
81. For a comprehensive chronology of events leading up to the creation of
the ICC, see Int’l Criminal Court, The ICC at a Glance: What is the ICC?, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 36–39 (2004).
82. Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 13(a).
83. Id. art. 13(b).
84. Id. art. 13(c). The Prosecutor needs to have a “reasonable basis” to initi-
ate an investigation. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 15; see also LEILA
NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THENEWMILLENNIUM 95 (M. Cherif Bas-
siouni et al. eds., 2002). The issue whereby the Prosecutor is able to trigger the
jurisdiction of the ICC through his or her own initiative was highly contested
in the drafting of the Rome Charter due to fear that the Prosecutor would wield
too much power. SeeMcCormack & Robertson, supra note 74, at 639.
85. For example, if the Security Council triggers ICC jurisdiction, the court
will not require the Security Council to additionally obtain consent of said
party. But, if the case is referred to the court either by another state or the
Prosecutor themself, the court will ask the referrer to establish both personal
jurisdiction of the state and to get consent of the state in question to exercise
jurisdiction. See Fowler, supra note 76.
86. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 19.
87. Id. art. 5.
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shock the conscience of humanity.”88 With respect to personal
jurisdiction, the Rome Charter enables the ICC to exercise juris-
diction over natural persons who directly89 or indirectly90 com-
mit a crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court,
but excludes unnatural persons like corporations or similarly
structured entities.
Limiting the power of the ICC is the principle of deferral to
domestic prosecutions through a process known as “complemen-
tarity.”91 In this way, the ICC exercises jurisdiction as a form of
last resort when states, who would normally prosecute the mat-
ter, are ill-equipped.92 In addition, inherent in exercising juris-
diction is the mandate that the alleged crimemust have occurred
subsequent to the Rome Charter entering into force on July 1,
2002.93
Ultimately, because the ICC is limited to adjudicating crimes
involving natural persons, the court would be unable to exercise
jurisdiction over the FIFA organization altogether. On the other
hand, the Rome Charter would allow the ICC to exercise juris-
diction over FIFA officials individually for their involvement in
Qatari human rights abuses.
88. Id. pmbl. In fact, Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Charter prevents the Pros-
ecutor from proceeding with a case if, in his or her judgment, the case does not
fall within a topic of grave concern. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art.
53(2)(c).
89. See generally Rome Charter, supra note 36, arts. 5–8.
90. See generally id. art. 25(3)(c).
91. The ICC defers to domestic courts unless the state is “unwilling” or “un-
able” to prosecute the matter. Id. pmbl. For an explanation of what factors go
into determining “unwillingness” or “unable” to prosecute under the Rome
Charter, see generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementa-
rity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 869, 894–95 (2002). See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 17(1)(b).
92. See Courts of First Resort: Prosecuting International Crimes at the Na-
tional Level, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Oct. 24, 2012),
https://www.ictj.org/news/courts-first-resort-prosecuting-international-
crimes-national-level.
93. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 11(1). Further, the court can only
exercise jurisdiction over events that happened after that state ratified the
Rome Charter. Id. art. 11(2). While this jurisdictional nuance is beyond the
scope of this Note, it leads to situations where the ICC cannot exert jurisdiction
over crimes if they occur after a state party signed the Rome Charter but before
the state ratified it within the home state. See SCHABAS, supra note 67, at 67.
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II. QATARIHUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND FIFA’S INVOLVEMENT
To host a World Cup, certain infrastructure, like roads,
bridges, transportation hubs, and stadiums in which the players
will compete, need to be built. At the time Qatar won its bid to
host the 2022 World Cup, the country lacked the necessary in-
frastructure. For example, in anticipation of the World Cup, Qa-
tar needed to build “new hotels, new tunnels, new highways, a
new subway system, a new airport, new (air-conditioned) stadi-
ums and entire new cities.”94 Yet, because Qatar is a nation of
only 2.2 million people, many of the construction projects that
are required to host the World Cup are being built by migrant
workers, who make up 90 percent of Qatar’s population.95 Cur-
rently, Qatar utilizes a system called kafala, which governs mi-
grant labor in the country. Simply stated, however, the working
conditions for migrant workers in Qatar under kafala is likened
to modern-day slavery.96 Workers are forced to live in inhospita-
ble camps that are unsanitary and overcrowded.97 Further, de-
ceptive practices by recruiters in the migrant workers’ home
countries as well as illegal tactics by Qatari employers, such as
passport confiscation and threats of nonpayment,98 exploit these
workers and restrict their free movement. This Part will detail
the intricacies of the kafala system and its effects on migrant
workers in Qatar. In addition, this Part will illuminate FIFA’s
indirect involvement in Qatari crimes through a corrupt bidding
process that ultimately granted Qatar the rights to host the 2022
World Cup.
94. Cubrilovic, supra note 23.
95. Id.
96. See Azfar Khan,Why It’s Time to End Kafala, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/26/time-to-end-
kafala.
97. See Greg Wilesmith & Eric Campbell, Qatar 2022: World Cup Project
Workers Living in Slum Conditions Behind Glitz of Oil-rich Country, ABC
NEWS (July 15, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-02/investigation-
into-qatar-2022-reveals-exploitation-of-workers/6511660.
98. See Owen Gibson,Migrant Workers Suffer ‘Appalling Treatment’ in Qa-
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A. The Kafala System of Labor
The system by which the state of Qatar exerts control over mi-
grant workers is known as kafala. The kafala system of labor,99
which is utilized by Qatar and other members of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council (GCC) countries, has been called the modern
equivalent of indentured servitude,100 or worse, modern-day
slavery.101 Currently, 70 percent of Qatar’s population102 and 90
percent of its total workforce are migrant workers.103 The only
way by which an entry visa and residence permit are obtained is
through sponsorship by a citizen or government agency.104 Spon-
sorship is procured through recruiting agencies in the worker’s
home country,105 and the applicant is required to pay exorbitant
99. Along with Qatar, the kafala system is still routinely used in other GCC
countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Lebanon. SeeMIGRANTFORUM INASIA, REFORM OF
THE KAFALA (SPONSORSHIP) SYSTEM 1 (2012), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migprac-
tice/docs/132/PB2.pdf. The system was implemented in the 1950s to procure
cheap foreign labor as a replacement for slavery. SeeHeather E. Murray,Hope
for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship System, Domestic Laws and
Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers in GCC Coun-
tries, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 461, 467 (2012). Initially, the primary purpose of
the kafala system was to meet the labor demands following the infusion of cap-
ital to extract oil. The GCC countries, however, quickly used the system as a
tool to control their migrant workforce by requiring employers to sponsor mi-
grant workers before they could work in the country. The sponsorship system
thus transferred power, with respect to migrant workers, from the government
to the employers, who continue to impose their will on migrant workers by
confiscating passports, restricting movement, and subjecting them to inhu-
mane living conditions. See ASIA PAC. MISSION FORMIGRANTS, KAFALA: IMPACT
AND RELATION TO MIGRANT LABOR BONDAGE IN GCC COUNTRIES 24–31 (2014),
http://www.apmigrants.org/articles/publications/Featured%20Re-
searches/Kafala%20Research%202014-FINAL.pdf.
100. See Richard Morin, Indentured Servitude in the Persian Gulf, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at SR4; U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons Report
2008, 212–13 (2008).
101. See Khan, supra note 96.
102. See Mona Chalabi, Qatar’s Migrants: How Have They Changed the
Country?, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/news/dat-
ablog/2013/sep/26/qatar-migrants-how-changed-the-country.
103. Migrant Workers Propel Qatar’s Population to 2.5 Million, NEW ARAB
(Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/3/2/migrant-
workers-propel-qatars-population-to-2-5-million.
104. SeeMurray, supra note 99.
105. See HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 58, at 28–29. Yet, a 2011 report
indicates that often times Qatar is the financial beneficiary of the workers pay-
ing recruitment fees and cooks its books deliberately to avoid penalties under
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fees to secure a job.106 Yet, there are no assurances that the ap-
plicant will be given the job discussed with the recruitment
agency or paid the job’s established rate of pay.107 The natural
result is that migrant workers are often underpaid, not paid on
time, or face wage deductions.108
Further restricting the power of migrant workers in Qatar is
the power imbalance between themigrant workers and their em-
ployers.109 Due to the fact that employers assume legal and fi-
nancial responsibility of the employee, employers frequently
confiscate the employees’ passports in order to exert control,110
despite the fact that Qatari Labor Law, which was enacted in
2004, prohibits the confiscation of passports.111 Employers,
known as kafeel, hold an inordinate amount of power,112 evi-
denced by the fact that employees need their permission in order
to quit or change employment.113 In addition, under the kafala
Qatari Labor Law. See WORLD BANK, THE QATAR-NEPAL REMITTANCE
CORRIDOR: ENHANCING THE IMPACT AND INTEGRITY OF REMITTANCE FLOWS BY
REDUCING INEFFICIENCIES IN THEMIGRATION PROCESS 9 (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 58, at 28–29.
106. Fees can range from hundreds to thousands of dollars to secure the job
and up to “100 percent interest on their debt per year.” HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,
supra note 58, at 28−29.
107. Id. at 31.
108. Id. at 34; see also Elizabeth B. Mutisya, International Corporate Liabil-
ity: A Solution for the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in Qatar, 5 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 513, 517 (2015).
109. See Froilan T. Malit & George Naufal, Asymmetric Information Under
the Kafala Sponsorship System: Impacts on Foreign Domestic Workers’ Income
and Employment Status in the GCC Countries 15–16 (Cornell Univ. ILR
School, Working Paper, 2014).
110. SeeMurray, supra note 99.
111. See HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 58, at 6.
112. Employers are given almost unadulterated power within the kafala sys-
tem over their workers with regards to work-related activities and non-work-
related activities, ranging from holding employees’ passports and canceling
workers’ visas to getting a driver’s license or opening a checking account. Id.
at 5; see alsoMorin, supra note 100.
113. See Sam Badger, Giorgio Cafiero, & Foreign Policy in Focus, Kingdom
of Slaves in the Persian Gulf, NATION (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.thena-
tion.com/article/kingdom-slaves-persian-gulf/.
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system, workers often live without basic necessities in substand-
ard “labor camps.”114 Yet, if employees wish to contest the em-
ployers’ actions, they will find little redress as they are prohib-
ited from both organizing115 and unionizing116 and are not paid
during the interim when they challenge the employer’s actions
through court or strike.117 Further, existing measures to monitor
human rights abuses by companies are wholly inadequate.118 As
a result, many have argued that the kafala system violates in-
ternational law because the system encourages human traffick-
ing119 and forced labor.120 Others have argued that immigrant
workers are trapped in Qatar because they are unable to move
freely within the country and their incurred debt in recruitment
fees prevent them from leaving the country.121
B. FIFA’s Involvement in Human Rights Abuses
FIFA’s fostering of Qatari human rights abuses stems from
corruption in the bidding process that led to the selection of Qa-
tar as host country of the 2022 World Cup.122 The exchange of
114. See HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 58, at 13. Sometimes, twenty to
thirty workers share a bedroom and one bathroom. Air conditioners also break-
down and take weeks to fix during the summer months, when temperatures
reach up to 114 degrees Fahrenheit. See id. at 13.
115. See Law No. 14 of 2004 on the Promulgation of Labor Law arts. 116, 120
(Qatar). Further, Qatari Labor Law discriminates against migrant workers be-
cause it allows only Qatari citizens to unionize.
116. Id. art. 116.
117. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 58, at 48.
118. To see an extensive depiction of the economic and cultural barriers mi-
grant employees face to get adequate remedies regarding human rights abuses
by their employer, see id. at 43–49.
119. SeeMutisya, supra note 108. For a definition of “human trafficking,” see
Tom Obokata, Smuggling of Human Beings from a Human Rights Perspective:
Obligations of Non-State and State Actors Under International Human Rights
Law, 17 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 394, 396 (2005).
120. See Priyanka Motaparthy, Understanding Kafala: An Archaic Law at
Cross Purposes with Modern Development, MIGRANT-RIGHTS (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/03/understanding-kafala-an-archaic-law-
at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/.
121. See Zahir Belounis, Zahir Belounis: ‘The System in Qatar is Killing Me.
Please Speak Up’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/football/2013/nov/14/zahir-belounis-letter-zinedine-zidane-pep-guar-
diola-qatar.
122. See Jack de Menezes, FIFA Corruption: Qatar and Russia World Cup
Bids Under FBI Investigation Following Chuck Blazer’s Bribery Confession,
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bribes for votes has long been the modus operandi of FIFA,123
and was the basis of a 2015 Swiss investigation into FIFA’s se-
lection of Qatar.124 FIFA’s contribution to human rights abuses
in Qatar, however, is not direct.125 Rather, FIFA’s white-collar
crimes, by which FIFA officials accepted Qatari bribes to solidify
votes for Qatar, were accepted knowing the existing human
rights abuses of migrant workers in Qatar126 and acknowledging
that granting the country the World Cup would amplify those
conditions. Thus, by granting Qatar the 2022 World Cup, FIFA,
in turn, exacerbated the problem because even more migrant
workers would be needed to build the brand new infrastruc-
ture.127
Amidst allegations of substandard conditions for migrant
workers in Qatar, FIFA maintained a position that it valued mi-
grant worker rights and was taking the issue of their abuse se-
riously.128 In addition, Federico Addiechi, FIFA’s head of sus-
tainability, publicly stated that “FIFA has been integrating hu-
INDEPENDENT (June 4, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/in-
ternational/fifa-corruption-qatar-and-russia-world-cup-bids-under-fbi-investi-
gation-following-chuck-blazers-10296177.html.
123. See generally JENNINGS, supra note 9.
124. SeeEuanMcKirdy, Swiss FIFA Corruption Allegations Grow, Cast Host-
ing of World Cups Further into Doubt, CNN (July 13, 2015), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2015/07/13/football/swiss-fifa-probe-widens/.
125. See Cork Gaines, A Staggering Number of Deaths Are Being Blamed on
FIFA’s Corruption, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2015), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/world-sporting-events-deaths-2015-5.
126. See Cubrilovic, supra note 23.
127. See Pete Pattisson, Revealed: Qatar’s World Cup ‘Slaves,’ INFO.
CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article36349.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
128. See Qatar 2022 World Cup Prep Faces Fresh Migrant Worker Abuse Al-
legations, ESPN (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.espnfc.com/blog/fifa/243/post/2840330/qatar-migrant-worker-
abuses-alleged-by-amnesty-international; see also Owen Gibson, FIFA Faces
‘Tough Decision’ Over Qatar World Cup If Human Rights Abuses Continue,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/foot-
ball/2016/apr/14/fifa-qatar-world-cup-report-human-rights (“FIFA [is] ‘fully
committed to respecting human rights’ and that ‘[t]his is an ongoing process
and of course challenges remain but FIFA is committed to playing its part in
ensuring respect for human rights and to being a leader among international
sports organisations in this important area.’”).
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man rights components in different aspects of its work, pro-
cesses, and activities for many years.”129 He also questioned a
2016 Amnesty International report that addressed the abuse of
migrant workers employed on FIFA-related projects, stating:
“The tone of Amnesty International’s latest assertions paint a
misleading picture and do nothing to contribute to our efforts.”130
FIFA’s efforts to curb Qatari abuses included a meeting with the
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)131 in 2011 to
discuss its role in working with both the organization and the
Qatari government to address Qatari labor issues.132 In the same
meeting, FIFA also agreed that granting of future World Cups
would be dependent, in part, on a new labor-related criteria.133
Further, FIFA facilitated the issuance of a Workers’ Charter in
2013, which aimed to ensure the fair treatment of workers, and
more substantively, the implementation of the Workers’Welfare
Standards document in 2014, which set out “mandatory, con-
tractually binding rules that ensure that contractors and sub-
contractors working on . . . projects operat[e] in line with the
principles and values outlined in the Workers’ Charter.”134 With
these guidelines and provisions, FIFA believed it had put a sys-
tem in place to improve the conditions for migrant workers em-
ployed on FIFA construction projects.135
FIFA selected Qatar as the host country for the 2022 World
Cup, however, despite its own internal evaluation committee re-
port suggesting that Qatar was unprepared to host due to a lack
129. Qatar 2022 World Cup Prep Faces Fresh Migrant Worker Abuse Allega-
tions, supra note 128.
130. Id.
131. The ITUC is an international trade federation whose object is for the
“promotion and defence of workers’ rights and interests, through international
cooperation between trade unions, global campaigning and advocacy within
the major global institutions.” About Us, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION,
http://www.ituc-csi.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
132. See Statement From Jérôme Valcke On Labour Rights In Qatar, supra
note 6.
133. Id.
134. FIFA Statement on Amnesty International’s Report on Qatar, FIFA (Dec.
1, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=fifa-State-
ment-on-amnesty-international-s-report-on-qatar-2741494.html.
135. See FIFA Statement on Latest Amnesty International Report on Qatar,
FIFA (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.fifa.com/world-
cup/news/y=2016/m=3/news=fifa-Statement-on-latest-amnesty-international-
report-on-qatar-2773473.html.
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of existing infrastructure.136 FIFA advises countries who are bid-
ding to host future World Cups to provide sixteen potential ven-
ues for which games will be played.137 At the time of Qatar’s pro-
posal, the country had three.138 Coupled with glaring insufficien-
cies in roads and bridges to get from one venue to the next, Qatar
was ill-equipped to deal with the massive infrastructure hurdles
it would face in hosting a World Cup.139
Further, FIFA chose Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup despite
knowing Qatar’s abuse of migrant workers through the kafala
system. FIFA’s corrupt bidding process allegedly exacerbated
the migrant worker situation in Qatar because it orchestrated a
situation where many more workers would be abused through
the construction projects that would be undertaken to host the
World Cup in Qatar. Currently, a case involving the white-collar
crimes of FIFA officials can be heard in the domestic courts of
the United States and Switzerland.140 Furthermore, a case cen-
tered on the human rights abuses of migrant workers can take




140. A case like FIFA’s can be heard in the domestic courts of Switzerland,
where FIFA is incorporated, the United States, where the financial institutions
were utilized, and Qatar, where the alleged abuses occurred. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is a regional court, may also have ju-
risdiction over the FIFA organization. For such an argument, see Michael B.
Engle, A CN Tower Over Qatar: An Analysis of the Use of Slave Labor in Prep-
aration for the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup and how the European Court of
Human Rights Can Stop It, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 177 (2014). The ju-
risdictional scope of the ECtHR, however, is limited to addressing human
rights violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and
crimes committed by one of the forty-seven members who make up the Council
of Europe. See ECHR in 50 Questions, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf. Thus, it is not a
truly global adjudicative body like the ICJ or the ICC. In addition, under the
ECHR, “both individual and inter-state applications can only be brought
against states. Any applications against individuals or companies are system-
atically rejected,” which further limits the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Jörg Po-
lakiewicz, Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights – Challenges and
Opportunities for Europe and Japan 8 (Nagoya Univ. Ctr. for Asian Legal
Exch. Discussion Paper No. 9, 2012), http://cale.law.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/_src/sc618/CALE20DP20No.209-121010.pdf. For a discussion on the
different ways the FIFA organization can be held accountable, see Roger Pielke
Jr., supra note 31.
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place in Qatar, where the abuse occurred.141 Yet, the ICJ and the
ICC, the most important international venues with respect to
hearing criminal actions, both have jurisdictional flaws, leading
to a situation where neither court is currently able to hear a case
where white-collar crimes led to human rights abuses else-
where.142 As a result, the abuse of migrant workers in Qatar will
persist in the wake of this jurisdictional gap if domestic courts
do not intervene.
III. WHY THE FIFA CASE IS IMPORTANT TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Both the ICJ and the ICC are unable to adjudicate matters
involving white-collar crimes that lead to human rights abuses.
This Part begins by summarizing the jurisdictional problems of
the ICJ, which has general subject matter jurisdiction over in-
ternational disputes, including human rights violations, but lim-
its personal jurisdiction to only states.143 This would prevent the
ICJ from having personal jurisdiction over both the FIFA organ-
ization and its officials individually. This Part continues by an-
alyzing the jurisdictional issues of the ICC, which limits subject
matter jurisdiction to grave international crimes.144 Further,
personal jurisdiction under the ICC is limited to natural per-
sons,145 meaning that the ICC would be precluded from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over nonnatural persons like the FIFA organiza-
tion. The result is that an international criminal case against
FIFA would need to be against FIFA officials in the ICC. Be-
cause FIFA officials did not directly commit the human rights
violations against migrant workers, FIFA officials would need to
be charged as accomplices under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome
Charter. This Part then analyzes the merits and limitations of
prosecuting FIFA officials as accomplices in the ICC. Finally,
this Part concludes with a brief discussion describing why
FIFA’s indirect involvement in Qatari human rights abuses is
important in the context of adjudicating international crimes.
141. See Qatar: Promotion of the Rule of Law and Human Rights, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/portfolio-items/qatar-promotion-
and-protection-of-human-rights/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
142. See infra Part III.C.
143. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 34.
144. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 5; see also Statute of the ICJ, su-
pra note 35, pmbl.
145. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(1).
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A. Jurisdictional Failures of the ICJ
Under the ICJ Statute, the ICJ has general subject matter ju-
risdiction over international law disputes. This includes ques-
tions of international law, breaches of international obligations,
and damages for such breaches, including human rights viola-
tions.146 The ICJ, however, must also exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties in order to adjudicate the dispute before it.
Yet, under the ICJ Statute, the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over both
the FIFA organization and its officials individually because both
the entity and the individuals are not states, which is required
under the treaty.147 As a result, the ICJ would only have partial
jurisdiction over the FIFA organization or its officials and, thus,
would be unable to adjudicate a case involving white-collar
crimes that led to human rights abuses in Qatar.
B. Jurisdictional Failures of the ICC
Under the Rome Charter, the ICC has subject matter jurisdic-
tion over crimes that are considered most serious to the interna-
tional community.148 These atrocities include genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and acts of aggression.149 As a
result, the types of crimes that the ICC can hear are limited,
unlike the ICJ, which has a broader scope with respect to subject
matter jurisdiction. Complicating the matter further, the ICC,
thus far, has not adjudicated a case in which white-collar crimes
(which the ICC does not have subject matter jurisdiction over)
led to human rights abuses (which the court does have subject
matter jurisdiction over). As a result, it is unclear whether the
ICC would have subject matter jurisdiction if a case against
FIFA or its officials were referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC.
With respect to personal jurisdiction, the ICC provides for per-
sonal jurisdiction over individuals who commit crimes either di-
rectly150 or as an accomplice indirectly involved.151 Personal ju-
risdiction, however, is limited to natural persons, meaning that
the ICC would only be able to exercise jurisdiction over FIFA
146. See Statute of the ICJ, supra note 35, art. 36, para. (2)(a)–(c).
147. Id. art. 34.
148. See id. pmbl; Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 5.
149. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 5.
150. Id. art. 25(a)–(b).
151. Id. art. 25(3)(c).
1418 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
officials and not over nonnatural entities like the FIFA organi-
zation.152 Further, FIFA officials’ participation in Qatari human
rights abuses was not direct. Rather, their contributions con-
sisted of accepting bribes with knowledge of existing human
rights abuses in Qatar in order to solidify votes for the country
to host the 2022 World Cup.153 This provided the opportunity for
more migrant workers to be abused under kafala through the
construction of new infrastructure necessary to host the World
Cup.154 As a result, a case against FIFA in the ICC would have
to be against FIFA officials who accepted the bribes as accom-
plices indirectly involved in Qatari human rights abuses of mi-
grant workers.
C. Accomplice Liability of the ICC
Assuming for now that both subject matter and personal juris-
diction are met in a hypothetical case against FIFA officials, the
applicable portion of the Rome Charter to prosecute them as ac-
complices is Article 25(3)(c). This section states: “For the purpose
of facilitating the commission of such a crime, [the individual]
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its at-
tempted commission, including providing the means for its com-
mission.”155 Ultimately, the Prosecutor of the ICC would need to
show that Qatari crimes were committed by someone other than
FIFA officials and that, in accepting bribes, FIFA officials had
both the requisite actus reus andmens rea 156 in committing their
complicit acts.
1. Actus Reus
To date, the ICC has not determined what acts are sufficient
in proving the actus reus component of accomplice liability under
152. See supra Part I.B.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. Id.
155. Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(3)(c).
156. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, actus reus is the prohibited con-
duct of the crime. See Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Mens rea relates to having a guilty mind when committing the crime. See Mens
Rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In the international context,
however, there are no universal definitions for actus reus and mens rea. See
Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Pre-
liminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 144, 148–49 (1999).
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its jurisdiction.157 As a result, the ICC would likely lean on prior
tribunals and their adjudications of what constitutes “complicit
acts”158 in order to define the scope of actus reus with regards to
accomplice liability. This exercise may prove to be challenging,
however, because prior tribunals have utilized different stand-
ards (and even courts within the same tribunal have used differ-
ent standards), which has led to different results as to which acts
constitute complicit acts for accomplice liability.159 For example,
the ICTY and the ICTR have articulated, as in the Rome Char-
ter, that in order to prove accomplice liability, the actions must
“provid[e] the means” to facilitate the crime through supplies or
knowledge.160 Yet, the ICTY and the ICTR have also more liber-
ally interpreted silent approval of the underlying crime as a suf-
ficient act under the “approving spectator” standard, in which
accomplice liability is proved through a combination of presence
and support.161 Under this standard, the accomplice must have
presence in the state where the crime occurs either by physically
being in the state or from afar and, through his or her position
of power, incites or encourages the underlying crime to take
place.162 Overall, in order to prove actus reus, the complicit acts,
through whichever test the court uses, need to have a “substan-
tial effect” on the underlying crime.163 Yet, because a clear defi-
nition of “substantial effect” does not exist, this determination
requires a case-by-case inquiry by the court.164
157. See Hans Vest, Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal
Responsibility Under International Law, 8 J. INT’LCRIM. JUST. 851, 858 (2010).
158. For the elements and forms of actus reus within decisions of tribunals,
see IRYNAMARCHUK, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 220–30 (2014).
159. See SARAH FINNIN, ELEMENTS OF ACCESSORIAL MODES OF LIABILITY:
ARTICLE25(3)(B)AND (C)OFTHEROMECHARTEROFTHE INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL
COURT 72–89 (2012); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 482–85 (Special Court for Sierra Leone May 18, 2012) (stating that actus
reus in accomplice liability can include an omission of action as well as tangible
acts).
160. Actions that have been shown to “provid[e] the means” to help the un-
derlying crime take place include providing materials, knowledge, and money.
See, e.g., FINNIN, supra note 159, at 81–82.
161. See, e.g., id. at 77–78, 83.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 126–28.
164. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, 2 CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 19 (2008) [herein-
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In regards to crimes within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the Rome Charter generally requires the court to hear the
gravest types of crimes.165 The Rome Charter, however, is silent
as to how serious the acts that aid and abet the commission of
these grave crimes have to be in order to satisfy the actus reus
portion of accomplice liability. Julia Graff summarizes this point
as follows:
By analogy, if a company operating in the D[emocratic] R[epub-
lic] [of] C[ongo] trades weapons for diamonds, the ICC might
deem such weapons the means for the commission of a crime.
However, if a corporation purchases diamonds from a rebel
group or a state whose military uses the revenue to purchase
arms for use against civilians, will the purchase money itself
fall within the definition of “means of commission” or “contri-
bution” to the crime?166
While this hypothetical cannot apply to organizations because
the ICC only has personal jurisdiction over natural persons, the
same problem exists with respect to individual accomplices in
determining whether their acts are sufficient to be complicit in
the commission of a crime under the Rome Charter.
after INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 2], http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-
2008.pdf; Andrea Reggio, Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law:
The Responsibility of Corporate Agents and Businessmen for ‘Trading with the
Enemy’s of Mankind, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 623, 671 (2005); see also Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session,
[1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 18, 21, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 [hereinafter ILC Re-
port] (articulating the language of the mens rea of “knowingly” to include acts
that “assist[] directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime.”).
In interpreting “substantial,” however, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated
that the underlying crime would not have occurred in the same fashion had it
not been for the accomplice’s involvement. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 688, 691–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶ 326 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 234–35 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
165. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, pmbl.
166. Julia Graff, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal
Court: Blood and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 23, 26 (2004).
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Recently, the ICC announced that it will be prosecuting CEOs,
whose business commits environmental crimes, as accom-
plices.167 Such activities include “land grabbing, a practice that
has seen multinationals take over large areas of foreign land to
exploit its natural resources without benefiting the local inhab-
itants.”168 Similarly, “CEOs whose businesses are found to be
complicit in razing tropical rainforests, poisoning water supplies
or seizing land will face prosecution.”169 These future prosecu-
tions will provide insight as to the types of acts that will satisfy
the actus reus prong of accomplice liability (albeit, only with re-
spect to environmental crimes).
Ultimately, FIFA’s officials neither implemented the kafala
system in Qatar nor “provide[d] the means” through direct sup-
plies,170 finances,171 or knowledge to support the kafala system.
The kafala system has been in place since the 1950s and pre-
ceded FIFA’s granting of hosting rights to Qatar.172 FIFA offi-
cials’ acceptance of bribes equally did not “provide the means”
for Qatar to commit human rights abuses through materials,
money, or knowledge, unless the ICC accepts the unpersuasive
argument that accepting bribes facilitated the kafala system to
work effectively. In other words, the court would have to find
that, by selecting Qatar to host the 2022World Cup through vote
buying, the officials indirectly supported the kafala system and,
as such, made it easier for Qatari employers to abuse migrant
workers. Yet, that is not the case here. FIFA officials did not
make it easier for Qatar to commit human rights abuses. Rather,
by accepting bribes, FIFA officials made an existing condition,
the kafala system, worse because they provided for more oppor-
tunities for Qatar to commit human rights abuses.
167. See Khan, supra note 39.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 533,
536 (Sept. 2, 1998).
171. See United States v. Flick et al., in VI TRIALS OFWARCRIMINALSBEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW [T.W.C.]
NO. 10, at 1216 (1949–1953); Craig Forcese, Deterring “Militarized Commerce”:
The Prospect of Liability for “Privatized” Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA L.
REV. 171, 174–77, 185 (2000) (describing a situation in Colombia where British
Petroleum, a British owned corporation, knowingly paid a “war tax” in Colom-
bia to the Colombian government, who was known to have committed numer-
ous human rights abuses in the past, in order to protect its oil reserves).
172. SeeMorin, supra note 100.
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A stronger argument to satisfy actus reus would be under the
more liberal approving spectator standard, where the Prosecutor
would show that FIFA officials had a presence173 in Qatar when
it granted the country the 2022 World Cup, was aware of the use
of immigrant workers,174 and encouraged the human rights
abuses by being willfully blind to existing conditions when they
accepted the bribes. Ultimately, a hypothetical case against
FIFA officials as accomplices would be one of first impression for
the ICC. Complicating matters further is the fact that the Rome
Charter does not provide directives through expanded defini-
tions of the terms within Article 25.175 Thus, the ICC will need
to rely on the broken rudder of prior tribunals’ different tests to
steer it in determining accomplice liability through white-collar
acts.
2. Mens Rea
In addition to proving actus reus, the Prosecutor of the ICC
would also have to establish mens rea, or the mental component
of the crime, in order to prove accomplice liability.176 Generally,
to prove mens rea for any crime under the ICC, the Prosecutor
must prove the actor committed the crime with both intent and
knowledge,177 unless otherwise provided.178 Such “intent” mani-
fests when the actor either wants to participate in the alleged
conduct, wants to cause a particular outcome, or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events.179 “Knowledge” in-
cludes awareness that a circumstance exists or that a conse-
quence will occur in the ordinary course of events.180 Ironically,
173. See FINNIN, supra note 159, at 77–78, 83.
174. See Cubrilovic, supra note 23.
175. See FINNIN, supra note 159, at 72.
176. With regards to ICTR discussion of mens rea of accomplice liability, see
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 538–43 (Sept. 2,
1998). To see ICTY discussion of mens rea of accomplice liability, see Prosecu-
tor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006) (holding that the defendant was an accom-
plice in a joint criminal enterprise); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
177. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 30(1).
178. Id.
179. Id. art. 30(2)(a)–(b); see also FINNIN, supra note 159, at 163.
180. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 30(3).
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had intent and knowledge applied to Article 25(3)(c), FIFA offi-
cials likely would be guilty as accomplices.181 Nevertheless,
when the analysis shifts to the mens rea of accomplice liability
under Article 25(3)(c), the statute creates a new burden of prov-
ing that the actions of the accomplice were done “purposely.”182
The language and meaning of “purposely” is yet to be addressed
by the ICC.183 Traditionally in the international context, a treaty
is interpreted according to the plain meaning of its terms.184Cur-
rently, while variations exist among common law and civil law
countries in interpreting “purposely,” there is general harmony
that the plain reading of the term “purposely” means that the
person committing the crime desires to cause a particular out-
come of the crime.185 In applying that standard to FIFA officials,
181. This is assuming of course that the actus reus component has been sat-
isfied. According to the Model Penal Code, a person acts with knowledge when
he or she is practically certain that the action will lead to a particular result.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Here, it is likely
that at the time FIFA officials accepted Qatari bribes, they saw as highly prob-
able that Qatari human rights conditions would get worse because the infra-
structure needed to build stadiums and roads for the World Cup would require
more workers, and the situation would provide more opportunities for abuse.
Such acts and their attendant circumstances would fit nicely within Article
30(2)(b) of the Rome Charter, which takes on a mens rea of “knowingly” with
regard to intent of the perpetrator. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art.
30(2)(b); FINNIN, supra note 159, at 166.
182. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(3)(c); DESISLAVA STOITCHKOVA,
TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 107 (2010).
Yet, this language varies significantly with the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which was used by the Interna-
tional Law Commission in drafting the Rome Charter. The Draft Code advo-
cated for “knowledge” as the appropriate mens rea and not “purposely” as it is
written in the statute. See ILC Report, supra note 164, at 21.
183. See Sabine Michalowski, The Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding
and Abetting Liability—Conclusions From International Criminal Law, 18
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 237, 257 (2014). This is because the ICC has not
prosecuted a case involving complicit liability. See Information Regarding the
Potential Liability of Businesspersons for Atrocity Crimes Under the Rome
Charter, AM. NON-GOV’T ORG. COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 1, 2016, 2:58
AM), http://www.amicc.org/docs/ICCandBusTrans.pdf (stating that “the Pros-
ecutor of the ICC has not yet begun any formal investigations” for individual
liability and, thus derivatively, has not addressed the language of “purposely”
in the accomplice liability section of the Rome Charter).
184. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
185. See, e.g., MICHAELBOHLANDER, PRINCIPLESOFGERMANCRIMINALLAW 63-
64 (2009); see also Nicola Pisani, The Mental Element in International Crime,
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the Prosecutor of the ICC would have to prove that they acted
with a desire to bring about the Qatari human rights abuses of
the migrant worker population through the kafala system. Fur-
ther, if actions are shown to have been done “purposely,”186 the
Prosecutor must then show that such actions were done to facil-
itate, or make it easier for, the Qatari government to abuse im-
migrant workers.187 Such language creates an unrealistically
high burden in proving the mens rea component in accomplice
liability, particularly in white-collar criminal actions because, in
more cases than not, the intentions of businesses are financially
motivated188 and not to commit international crimes.189
More importantly, the language leaves a jurisdictional gap for
when an individual may not share the intent to participate in
human rights abuses or to facilitate said abuses,190 but who bla-
tantly disregards the social environment of another country,
in 2 ESSAYS ON THEROMECHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT 126
(Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas eds., 2004); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
div 5.2(1) (Austl.); ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 171–72
(6th ed. 2009).
186. Such a purpose can be shown either as a direct or secondary purpose.
See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’LHUM. RTS. 304, 312 (2008).
187. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(3)(c).
188. See STOITCHKOVA, supra note 182, at 103–05.
189. It would also be difficult to prove the motivation of a nonnatural indi-
vidual (in this case, of an organization). See Chad S.C. Stover, Best Practices
in Proving Specific Intent and Malice. What Can Civil and Criminal Litigators
Learn from One Another?, AM. BAR ASS’N 10–11 (2014), http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materi-
als/2014_sac/2014_sac/best_practices.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Gabriele
Marcotti, How Can FIFA Seek Restitution From Itself And Its Member Federa-
tions?, ESPN (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.espnfc.com/blog/espn-fc-
united/68/post/2830525/fifa-seeks-restitution-for-lost-revenue-gab-marcotti-q-
and-a (stating that “organizations cannot conspire.”).
190. For an analysis discussing the harmonization of the knowledge standard
with the “purposely” language in the Rome Charter, see Michalowski, supra
note 183, at 243–44; James G. Stewart, An Important New Orthodoxy on Com-
plicity in the ICC Statute?, JAMES G. STEWART BLOG (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicity-in-the-
icc-statute/ (Sarah Finnin & NemaMilaninia argument). For an argument dis-
cussing why themens rea of “purposely” should include actions of the complicit
actor done in furtherance of an ulterior motive not coinciding with the intent
of the primary actor’s secondary motives, see Cassel, supra note 186. For a
position advocating that the difference between the “knowingly” and “pur-
posely”mens rea is mere semantics because the analysis of accomplice liability
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thereby exacerbating existing human rights abuses in that coun-
try. White-collar crimes like bribery fall short of the “purposely”
language in the Rome Charter and allow individuals to skirt the
ICC’s jurisdictional reach. Thus, some authorship advocates for
reading “purposely” expansively to include a complicit actor’s ac-
tions irrespective of sharing the same intent as the primary ac-
tor.191 Such a view, however, is not considered a norm of inter-
national law.192
D. The Effects of No Jurisdiction
Under the construct of international criminal adjudications,
both the ICJ and the ICC have jurisdictional flaws with respect
to hearing cases where white-collar crimes led to human rights
abuses. The ICJ has general subject matter jurisdiction over in-
ternational disputes but fails to have personal jurisdiction over
FIFA or its officials because they are not states.193 Similarly, the
ICC lacks personal jurisdiction over FIFA as an organization be-
cause the Rome Charter provides that only natural persons can
be subject to a suit.194 Further, the ICC’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion is limited to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and acts of aggression.195 The white-collar crimes of FIFA offi-
cials, in accepting bribes for votes, are thus outside the ambit of
will remain the same irrespective of which mens rea is used, see INT’L COMM’N
OF JURISTS 2, supra note 164, at 22–24.
191. See Hans Vest, supra note 157, at 861. For a general example using the
Zyklon B case, see Kristian Kühl, STRAFRECHT. ALLGEMEINER TEIL 74 (5th ed.
2005); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, 1 CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 22 (2008)
[hereinafter INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 1], http://icj.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.1-Corporate-legal-accountability-
thematic-report-2008.pdf (stating that the “purposely” requirement is irrele-
vant if a reasonable company, in doing its due diligence, would have known
about a particular risk in supplying the goods or services to the underlying
criminal actor).
192. Compare Stewart, supra note 190, and Thomas Weigend, How to Inter-
pret Complicity in the ICC Statute, JAMES G. STEWART BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://jamesgstewart.com/how-to-intepret-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/, with
Adil Ahmad Haque, The U.S. Model Penal Code’s Significance for Complicity
in the ICC Statute: An American View, JAMESG. STEWARTBLOG (Dec. 13, 2014),
http://jamesgstewart.com/the-u-s-model-penal-codes-significance-for-complic-
ity-in-the-icc-statute-an-american-view/.
193. See supra Part I.A.
194. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(1).
195. See supra Part I.B.
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the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC,196 despite the argu-
ment that their bribes indirectly led to systematic abuse of mi-
grant workers in Qatar197 (which the court would have subject
matter jurisdiction over).
In addition, high thresholds in proving accomplice liability un-
der the Rome Charter further limit the existing jurisdiction of
the ICC to prosecute individuals.198 Further, while the ICC re-
cently announced that it would be prosecuting CEOs whose busi-
nesses are complicit in human rights violations, these prosecu-
tions are limited to environmental crimes,199 which restricts the
types of acts for which CEOs specifically can be held liable as
accomplices in the ICC. This leaves the ICC particularly vulner-
able as a court that is unprepared in the global corporate age200
because it contains jurisdictional inadequacies and its default
196. Ironically, the ICC itself has said in the past that white-collar crimes
may lead to an individual being liable under the ICC but has failed to prosecute
such a case. With respect to illegal mining operations in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated: “Those who direct mining
operations, sell diamonds or gold extracted in these conditions, launder the
dirty money or provide weapons could also be authors of the crimes, even if
they are based in other countries.” Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the
ICC, Second Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Charter of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC (Sept. 3, 2003),
http://legal.un.org/icc/asp/2ndsession/ocampo_statement_8sep(e).pdf (empha-
sis added); see also Presentation by the Chief Prosecutor on the Occasion of the
Press Conference of 16 July 2003 (ICC-OTP-20030724-28), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=045f8e37 -f401-44eb-8219-531fae932e86&lan=en-GB.
Additionally, there has been a push, especially by the Obama administration,
for viewing white-collar crimes that lead to humanitarian crimes as an inter-
national crime. Other organizations, however, do not share the same senti-
ment. See Richard L. Cassin, The Obama Doctrine, FCPA BLOG (June 2, 2010,
7:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/6/2/the-obama-doctrine.html; see
also Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as an International Crime and Crime Against
Humanity: An Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 466, 475 (2006) (arguing that corrupt acts should be considered a
part of crimes against humanity).
197. See supra Part II.B.
198. See supra Part III.C.
199. See Khan, supra note 39.
200. This comes to light even further given the ruling in the U.S. Supreme
Court case Kiobel, where the court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute over a corporation for human rights abuses committed ex-
clusively outside the United States, thus limiting the scope of when corpora-
tions can be held liable. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1677 (2013).
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position is to defer to domestic prosecutions.201 The FIFA exam-
ple brings to the forefront a situation that may present itself
with more frequency moving forward with the rise of global cor-
porations: when neither the ICJ nor the ICC will be able to pros-
ecute cases where organizations or their officials have a hand in
human rights abuses abroad.
Acknowledging the jurisdictional deficiencies of the ICJ and
the ICC, organizations and their officials, nonetheless, have
been sued in the past in domestic courts and tribunals for their
involvement in human rights abuses. For example, domestic
courts of individual nations have exercised jurisdiction over or-
ganizations for their direct involvement in human rights abuses
for supplying technology, goods, or services, and providing finan-
cial or logistical assistance.202 That said, only a handful of coun-
tries have legislated personal jurisdiction over organizations un-
der their laws.203 Further, prosecutors in these nations have
been reluctant to prosecute cases involving corporate liability
because of the political ramifications that would ensue.204 Ulti-
mately, one would think that the domestic courts where the
201. See El Zeidy, supra note 91, at 899.
202. See generally JENNIFER ZERK, CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES: TOWARDS A FAIRER ANDMORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC
LAW REMEDIES 17–23 (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Busi-
ness/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf.
203. See Cassel, supra note 186, at 322; See ZERK, supra note 202, at 32.
204. For example, Burmese citizens sought to hold Total Fina Elf, a French
oil company, responsible as accomplices for aiding the Burmese military kid-
nap individuals to erect a pipeline in Burma. See Jodie A. Kirshner, A Call for
the EU to Assume Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Corporate Human Rights
Abuses, 13 NW. J. OF INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (2015). At the time, Belgium pro-
vided for jurisdiction over all humanitarian claims, even if they did not relate
to Belgium, and accepted the Total Fina Elf case. Id. at 15. The United States
did not approve of Belgium’s actions, and
[i]n the aftermath of other controversial claims against high-
ranking foreign officials, . . . the U.S. threatened to move the
N[orth] A[tlantic] T[reaty] O[rganization] headquarters out
of Brussels unless Belgium revoked the rules. Without the
extraterritorial jurisdiction that they had offered, the Bel-
gian court could no longer adjudicate the case against Total.
It could not pursue allegations brought by Burmese citizens
against a French company for abuses in Burma.
Id. at 15–16.
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harm occurred would provide the best forum to adjudicate dis-
putes involving business involvement in human rights abuses
because that is where the relevant evidence and witnesses are
likely to be. Domestic prosecutions against organizations, how-
ever, remain rare because of the difficulty in proving human
rights abuses and the expense of maintaining a suit against a
large multinational entity.205 As a result, organizations have
been able to escape liability, even in properly situated domestic
courts.
At the international level, cases addressing business involve-
ment in human rights abuses is even rarer. The International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nürnberg addressed a few instances
where business officials served as accomplices to crimes commit-
ted by the Hitler regime during World War II. The charter es-
tablishing the jurisdiction of the IMT provided for subject matter
jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.206 This allowed the tribunal to prosecute busi-
ness officials who had financial commitments to the Nazi re-
gime,207 provided loans for the operation of concentration
camps,208 and supplied poisonous gas for use in extermination
chambers.209 For example, in Flick, two businessmen were con-
victed of aiding and abetting criminal activities by providing
large financial contributions to the Schutzstaffel (“SS”), who car-
ried out the mass exterminations of Jews, among others.210 The
IMT reasoned that “[a]n organization which on a large scale is
responsible for such crimes can be nothing else than criminal,”
205. See GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL
REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 18
(2013), http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/The-Third-Pillar-
FINAL1.pdf.
206. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6 (a)–(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
207. See United States v. Flick et al., in VI TRIALS OFWARCRIMINALSBEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW [T.W.C.]
NO. 10, at 103 (1949–1953).
208. See United States v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al. (Ministries Case), in
XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW [ T.W.C.] NO. 10, at 850–51 (1949–1953).
209. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B case), in 1 U.N.WAR
CRIMESCOMMISSIONLAWREPORTS OFWARCRIMINALS 101 (1947–1949); see also
Wim Huisman & Elies van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, In-
ternational Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 803, 816
(2010).
210. See Flick, VI T.W.C. at 1189.
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and that “[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and money con-
tributes to the support thereof must, under settled legal princi-
ples, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory
to such crimes.”211 In Ministries, however, the IMT came to the
opposite conclusion, despite similar facts. Defendant Karl
Rasche was a high-ranking board member of Dresdner Bank,
and was convicted for, inter alia, providing loans to the SS with
knowledge that the money would be used to support enterprises
that operated resettlement programs and concentration
camps.212 The IMT found that, with respect to the resettlement
programs, Rasche simply was trying to generate a profit and
thus could “well be condemned from a moral standpoint” but
whose activities could “hardly be said to be a crime.”213 With re-
spect to financially supporting concentration camps, the IMT
ruled that Rasche was not guilty, stating: “Our [IMT’s] duty is
to try and punish those guilty of violating international law, and
we are not prepared to state that such loans constitute a viola-
tion of that law, nor has our attention been drawn to any ruling
to the contrary.”214 Finally, in Zyklon B, corporate businessmen
Bruno Tesch and Karl Weinbacher worked for the company
Tesch & Stabenow, who knowingly supplied Nazi concentration
camps with poisonous gas used in gas chambers.215 The defend-
ants were convicted of aiding and abetting murder by the Nazi
regime and sentenced to death by hanging.216 As a result, while
only representing a handful of examples, these cases provide a
glimpse into the prosecution of business involvement in human
rights abuses at the international level.
More recently, the ICTY and ICTR were established to address
human rights concerns in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
respectively.217 The U.N. Security Council established the ICTY
211. Id. at 1217.
212. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., XIV T.W.C. at 620.
213. Id. at 621.
214. Id.
215. See Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B case), in 1 U.N.WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION LAW REPORTS OFWAR CRIMINALS 101 (1947–1949).
216. Id. at 100.
217. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, How Effective are International
Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR, 9 INT’L J. OFHUM.
RTS. 349, 350 (2005).
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tribunal ad hoc under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter218 for
crimes committed between January 1, 1991 and a date to be de-
termined later by the Security Council.219 The court ultimately
had subject matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Convention, violations of laws or customs of war, geno-
cide, and crimes against humanity.220 Similarly, the ICTR was
established ad hoc under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and
had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and vi-
olations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II for crimes committed in the 1994 calendar
year.221
Unlike the IMT, however, to date, both the ICTY and the ICTR
have not addressed business involvement in human rights
abuses.222 This is due to the fact that the statutes establishing
both the ICTY and the ICTR allow personal jurisdiction only
over natural persons.223 Further, as adjudicative bodies, the tri-
bunals (including the IMT) were created to be temporary, with
the purpose of addressing temporal crimes within a specific date
range and on specific issues local to that region.224 So, while the
tribunals served, and continue to serve, as large judicial bodies
to adjudicate crimes similar to what the ICJ or the ICC might
hear, their temporary nature and localized jurisdiction limit
their impact as a global adjudicative body for international
crimes.
The ICC and the ICJ on the other hand are unique judicial
bodies because of their roles as global forums for adjudicating
international criminal disputes. In light of the problems with do-
mestic courts (which often times fail to exercise jurisdiction over
organizations through abuse of discretion or because of lack of
218. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia art. 1, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1325 (May 25, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter ICTY Statute].
219. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993).
220. See ICTY Statute, supra note 218, arts. 2–5.
221. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda arts. 2–4, 7, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
222. See Vest, supra note 157, at 858; see also Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive
Territoriality”: A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Busi-
ness Crimes, 31 GA. J. OF INT’L&COMP. L. 1, 1 n.6 (2002).
223. See ICTY Statute, supra note 218, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 221,
art. 5.
224. See Lilian A. Barria & Steven D. Roper, supra note 217, at 353–55.
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legislation addressing jurisdiction over businesses) and tribu-
nals (who are created to be temporary and only address local is-
sues), the existing jurisdictional inadequacies between the ICJ
and ICC loom larger in case these forums cannot or choose not
to prosecute. If such a problem continues to persist, it will pro-
vide an avenue that organizations and its officials can use to es-
cape liability for their role in human rights abuses. Thus, FIFA’s
involvement with Qatar is important because it highlights a
glaring weakness in the construct of international criminal ad-
judication.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Under the current structure, so long as domestic courts do not
prosecute organizations or their officials, they will be allowed to
act with impunity internationally due to jurisdictional nuance
among the ICJ and the ICC.225 The ICJ, due to its ties to the
U.N., however, is unlikely to extend its reach beyond the scope
of handling disputes amongst states (barring some unforeseen
change in events) because the U.N., and by extension the ICJ,
were promulgated in the advent of World War II to maintain in-
ternational peace and security between states.226
Instead, an amendment to the Rome Charter, which already
has jurisdiction over individuals included in the treaty,227 would
allow for more meaningful changes to extend its jurisdiction.
Several authors have already advocated for changes to the ICC
to make it a stronger adjudicative body.228 Amending the Rome
Charter to extend the jurisdictional reach of the ICC, particu-
larly with respect to accomplice liability, will empower the court
225. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 2, supra note 164, at 56; see also
STOITCHKOVA, supra note 182, at 18–19 (stating that business involvement in
human rights crimes is an important and pressing issue).
226. See U.N. Charter, supra note 50, art. 1.
227. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 25(3)(c).
228. See Michael Anderson, International Money Laundering: The Need for
ICC Investigative and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 763, 781
(2013); Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great International Institu-
tion of the Twentieth Century: The International Criminal Court’s Definition of
Genocide, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 351, 381–86 (2002) (pointing out specifically
that the ICC is currently failing to adequately address crimes of genocide);
Richard L. Cassin, Should ‘Grand Corruption’ Be a Crime Against Humanity?,
FCPA BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 2:28 AM), http://www.fcpa-
blog.com/blog/2012/8/22/should-grand-corruption-be-a-crime-against-human-
ity.html.
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and ensnare business officials whose conduct is beyond the reach
of the court’s current jurisdiction.229 In addition, amending the
Rome Charter to explicitly include business entities as persons
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the ICC would extend the
jurisdiction of the court by allowing it to hear cases involving
nonnatural persons such as FIFA.
Several administrative obstacles, however, make amending
the Rome Charter an inherently difficult and lengthy proce-
dure.230 Further, the issue of whether organizations should be
held liable as a person under the ICC was discussed in the meet-
ings leading up to the ratification of the Rome Charter but failed
to garner a consensus.231 Yet, the fact that business liability was
contemplated in the months leading up to the Rome Charter in-
dicates that this issue was and continues to be important. In
fact, the failure for the parties to reach a consensus on how busi-
ness entities should be treated with respect to liability under the
ICC represents an implicit acknowledgment that this issue de-
serves more attention. And it will continue to be prevalent so
229. For descriptions of how businesses can be held criminally and civilly li-
able, see INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 2, supra note 164, at 37–43; see also Wolf-
gang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maaβ, Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and Its
Challenges, 8 J. OF INT’LCRIM. JUST. 699, 700–09 (2010).
230. See Shah, supra note 228, at 381–83.
231. This decision was arrived at as follows:
During negotiations of the Rome Statute, the participating
states contemplated including legal persons under the ambit
of the ICC. The French delegation put forward a proposal
suggesting that criminal organizations, such as those men-
tioned in the Nuremberg trials, should be identified as illegal
and closed down or dissolved. Weeks of negotiations followed
and the parties put together a draft text on legal persons. The
draft text contained language that allowed the ICC to have
jurisdiction over legal persons, other than states, when the
crimes were committed on behalf of, or by agents or repre-
sentatives of, the legal person. In the end, however, the final
working paper produced by the consulting states changed the
focus from legal persons to juridical persons to highlight the
importance of individual prosecutions over prosecutions of le-
gal entities (citations omitted).
Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative Approaches
to Attributing Liability to Corporations for extraterritorial Abuses, 26 NW. J. OF
INT’L L. & BUS. 43, 58–59 (2005).
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long as the current business landscape continues to shift from
mom-and-pop stores to multinational businesses whose activi-
ties transcend physical borders and have the ability to assist the
commission of crimes around the globe with relative ease.232
As a result, Article 25 of the Rome Charter should be amended
as a way to strengthen the ICC. The amendment would require
three separate aspects, all of which will clarify the language in
the accomplice liability section of the Rome Charter, which in
turn will expand the scope of jurisdiction of the court. First, an
amendment should specifically include organizations and simi-
lar entities within the definition of a “person” that the court has
personal jurisdiction over. Second, the amendment should lower
themens rea requirement from “purposely” to “knowingly.” This
section would also include language that provides for liability
when an accomplice buries his or her head in the sand and, by
doing so, exacerbates current human rights atrocities. Thus, the
added language accounts for situations when an accomplice does
not share the same intent as the underlying criminal. Lastly, a
clear definition of “substantially facilitate” should be drafted in
the actus reus portion of the accomplice liability section in order
to provide specific criteria of the types of acts that are sufficient
to satisfy the actus reus requirement. In proposed form, the
amendment to Article 25 would read as follows:
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural and nonnatu-
ral persons pursuant to this Statute.
. . .
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the court if that person:
. . .
(c) Knowingly commits an act that aids or abets a crime within
the jurisdiction of the court. Such an act must substantially fa-
cilitate the commission or attempted commission of a crime un-
der this Charter, and may include acts that exacerbate ongoing
crimes over which this court has jurisdiction.
. . .
5. For the purpose of paragraph (3)(c):
232. See STOITCHKOVA, supra note 182, at 1, 4; see also INT’L COMM’N OF
JURISTS 2, supra note 164, at 5.
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(a) “Knowingly” within the meaning of this statute includes
both actual or constructive knowledge and reckless disregard
of the end result of the act when there was reason to believe, at
the time of the complicit act, that the actor suspected a risk
and nonetheless proceeded with the act.233
(b) “Substantially facilitate” within the meaning of this statute
can be accomplished both directly and indirectly234 and in-
cludes conduct that:
(1) enables the crime to occur;
(2) exacerbates the crime; or
(3) alters the way in which the crime is carried out.235
This proposed language to the amendment overcomes several
limitations within the language of the accomplice liability por-
tion of the Rome Charter. First, proposed Article 25(1) explicitly
includes nonnatural persons such as corporations and similarly
structured organizations within the jurisdiction of the court.236
As a result, the inclusion of businesses in the Rome Charter al-
lows the ICC to have personal jurisdiction over them237 and
would eliminate the dilemma of the court only having jurisdic-
tion over natural persons.238
233. Expansions of definitions are already present in the Rome Charter, par-
ticularly in Article 7, which add to the definition of crimes against humanity.
See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 7(2)(a)–(i); see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 228 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
234. See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Ran-
goon, An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability
of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 102–03 (2002).
235. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 1, supra note 191, at 10–13.
236. An inherent obstacle is how to adduce liability of an entity that is un-
natural such as a corporation. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 2, supra note 164,
at 56, 58. Several tests taken from domestic law adjudications in determining
corporate criminal liability, however, provide sufficient off-the-shelf solutions
to this conceptually difficult task. Such approaches include aggregation, pro-
active and reactive fault, corporate ethos, and constructive corporate fault. See
STOITCHKOVA, supra note 182, at 113–21.
237. While incorporating businesses into the definition of persons over which
the court could exercise jurisdiction, the court would remain subject to comple-
mentarity requirements under the Rome Charter. See Rome Charter, supra
note 36, pmbl.
238. See Information Regarding the Potential Liability of Businesspersons for
Atrocity Crimes Under the Rome Charter, supra note 183.
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Second, the new language in amended Article 25(3)(c) lowers
the mens rea of accomplices from “purposely” to “knowingly.”
The adjustment inmens rea is to accommodate actions the court
is likely to face with regards to accomplice liability: those who
want to engage with the criminal actors, but who do not neces-
sarily desire to bring about the crime.239With this alteration, the
new language accounts for the mens rea of accomplices who do
not share the intent of the individual committing the crime.240
Further, the “knowingly” mens rea standard is already articu-
lated as the default for crimes in the Rome Charter under Article
30(3).241 As a result, the lowered mens rea standard would not
prevent the court from hearing the gravest types of crimes
known to the international community as was intended for the
ICC.242
Third, the amended accomplice liability section provides for an
expanded definition of “substantially facilitate,” which, thus far,
has had an amorphous definition in the international commu-
nity with respect to what type of actions significantly impact the
commission of a crime.243 Using the modifier of substantial for
facilitation reiterates the language that cases have used and the
preparatory committee advocated for in determining accomplice
liability.244 At the same time, the expanded definition provides
specific elements that will have to be met in order to satisfy the
239. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment ¶¶
539–41 (Sept. 2, 1998).
240. See supra Part III.C.2.
241. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, art. 30(3).
242. Id. pmbl.
243. See Reggio, supra note 164; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No.
IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 162 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 46
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 234–35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-94A-T,
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 597 (Jan. 22, 2004).
244. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶
688, 691–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); see also
ILC Report, supra note 164, at 21 (regarding the mens rea of accomplice liabil-
ity, the preparatory committee stated that “an individual who ‘aids, abets or
otherwise assists’ in the commission of a crime by another individual incurs
responsibility for that crime if certain criteria are met. The accomplice must
knowingly provide assistance to the perpetrator of the crime.”); Prosecutor v.
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 691–92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Furundžija, Case No. IT-96-21-T at ¶ 448.
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actus reus requirement and will likely lead to less ambiguity
moving forward. The elements within the expanded definition
are taken from the influential International Commission of Ju-
rists,245 whose sole purpose in creating its panel of experts was
to determine the scope of when corporations can be held liable
with respect to human rights violations.246 The panel’s determi-
nations, while not a crystallization of current international
law,247 nonetheless carries significant weight with respect to an-
swering the question of which business activities make them ac-
countable in the perpetuation of human rights violations.248
Lastly, the new language for the statute attaches jurisdiction
to situations where the accomplice is aware of existing human
rights violations elsewhere but acts nonetheless, thereby exac-
erbating current conditions within that country. Moving for-
ward, businesses and their officials will not be able to simply
bury their head in the sand to counteract the higher mens rea of
“purposely.” This will provide an incentive for businesses and
their officials to act morally when engaging in business abroad,
while also allowing for the ICC to hear crimes of concern to the
international community.249 Such propositions broaden the ju-
risdictional scope of the ICC while not extending potential lia-
bility for accomplices too far.
245. The International Commission of Jurists, while only one group, is an
influential one. It serves as a consultant with regard to human rights to the
U.N. Economic and Social Council, the Council of Europe, and the African
Council, and has close ties to the Americas. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 1,
supra note 191, at Preface; see also About the ICJ, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS,
http://www.icj.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
246. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS 1, supra note 191, at Forward.
247. In fact, corporations have been active in counteracting such sentiment
through lobbying members of the U.N. with respect to promoting nonbinding
rules on corporations rather than imposing voluntary restrictions on behavior.
See Jens Martens, Corporate Influence on the Business and Human Rights
Agenda of the United Nations 5 (Glob. Policy Forum, Working Paper, 2014),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Corporate_Influ-
ence_on_the_Business_and_Human_Rights_Agenda.pdf.
248. In other areas, nongovernmental organizations have the ability to influ-
ence major change in the responsibilities of others. See generally Ann Marie
Clark, Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on International
Society, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 507, 512–14 (1995).
249. See Rome Charter, supra note 36, pmbl.
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CONCLUSION
FIFA’s selection of Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup has done
more than simply perpetuate the greedy stereotype that charac-
terizes massive multinational organizations. FIFA officials’ fur-
therance of human rights abuses through the acceptance of vote
buying has illuminated the jurisdictional inadequacies of major
international courts with respect to adjudicating crimes perpet-
uated by businesses and their officials. Ultimately, the failure of
the ICJ and the ICC to possess both complete and meaningful
jurisdiction over parties like FIFA as an organization or its offi-
cials poses a major concern for the future because it prevents
these parties from being haled into international criminal courts
and allows their involvement with human rights abuses to go
unpunished at the international level. While these courts were
intended to have limited jurisdiction, they were not necessarily
created to be impotent. As a result, an amendment to Article 25
of the Rome Charter that expands the personal jurisdiction of
the court to include nonnatural persons, lowers the mens rea
standard from “purposely” to “knowingly,” and clarifies the def-
inition of “substantially facilitate” in the actus reus portion of
the Article will bolster the jurisdictional reach of the ICC in to-
day’s global age of business. In turn, this will help prevent future
organizations or their individuals from getting a “free kick” on
their illegal international activities.
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